1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI 2 JACKSON DIVISION U. S. BANKMIPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI FILED 3 IN RE: 4 BILLY R. SULLIVAN AND APR 25 1991 DENALU A. SULLIVAN NO. 9001553JC 5 MOLLIE C. JONES- CLF DEPUTY 6 manager day to the total total **BEFORE:** HONORABLE EDWARD ELLINGTON 7 8 BENCH OPINION 9 Taken in the United States Bankruptcy Court, 100 E. Capitol Street, Jackson, Mississippi, on 10 Wednesday, April 17, 1991. 11 **APPEARANCES:** 12 J. WALTER NEWMAN, IV and DAVID BARIA 13 **NEWMAN & NEWMAN** 539 Trustmark Building 14 Jackson, Mississippi 39201 ATTORNEYS FOR DEBTORS 15 MARCUS M. WILSON and FLOYD M. SULSER, JR. 16 BENNETT, LOTTERHOS, SULSER & WILSON, P.A. Post Office Box 98 17 Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0098 ATTORNEYS FOR FIRST CITIZENS 18 NATIONAL BANK 19 20 REPORTED BY: 21 SUSAN M. YEAGER Certified Shorthand Reporter 22 Notary Public 23 24

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THE COURT:

A proof of claim controversy such as we have today, the procedures and burdens and so forth are explained in the Fifth Circuit opinion of In Re: Simmons, 765 Fed 2d 547. That was written by the Fifth Circuit on July 19, 1985, and it explains the procedural context in which we are today. It says, in effect, that a proof of claim is similar to a complaint in a civil action, and the objection is similar to a response and answer, and we came on for hearing in that context.

The issues that we are involved in today really grow out of Bankruptcy Code Section 506, which, in short form, says that a secured creditor whose security is of greater value than the debt that is owed to him is entitled to principle and his interest and attorney fees and cost of collection if the underlying documents provide for attorney fees.

The case that you could look to in getting a better explanation of that is <u>In Re:</u>

<u>Hudson Shipbuilders, Inc.</u>, reported at 794 Fed 2d,

1051. It was issued on July 23rd, 1986 and,

ironically enough, it grew out of a bankruptcy

case down on the Gulf Coast, but it really

explains Section 506 which we're dealing with today and the right of this court to hear it and the right of this court to apply federal standards rather than state standards, for instance, that the note from this case, I think that the bank would be entitled to 15 percent for collection fees, and 15 percent was way beyond any reasonable attorney fees. And this court can reduce it back to what would be reasonable, and it doesn't have to go with the 15 percent, but it does go on to illustrate the fact that when attorney fee questions are here, we are to use federal standards in deciding that issue.

The issue of attorney fees has been litigated, as you might imagine, numerous times, and frequently and repeatedly, and the Fifth Circuit has come up with some standards that we are to try to use best we can. And usually you're in the context of trying to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees for the debtor in possession, but the standards that were used in bankruptcy on that issue, really all the courts in the circuit are to be guided by the case of Johnson vs. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 Fed 2d, 714, which was issued in 1974, and that case

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was made applicable bankruptcy cases In the Matter of First Colonial Corporation of America, 544 Fed 2d, 1291, and it lists 12 items, which I will touch on again in a minute, and the Johnson analysis was further defined and refined by Judge Wisdom writing in the opinion in Copper Liquor Inc. vs. Adolph Coors Company, 624 Fed 2d 575, and it was condensed and restated in Cooper Liquor, Incorporated vs. Adolph Coors Company, 684 Fed 2d 1087 at pages 1090 through 1093, which came out in 1982.

In that opinion, I will quote in part, but not really, but in that case, although the Fifth Circuit said there were 12 factors for us to look at, they said that there were four factors that deserve special heed: One, the time and labor involved. That was item number 1; no. 5 the customary fee; item no. 8 the amount involved and the results obtained; and 9 the experience, reputation and ability of counsel. And they were to be considered in the following framework: One, ascertain the nature and extent of the services supplied by the attorney; two, value of the services according to the customary fee and quality of legal work; and three, adjust the

compensation on the basis of other factors that may be of significance in a particular case, relying on First Colonial.

I will not go through all of that quote, but there are some other cases that anyone that would be interested in now or on review would want to look at, and that's <u>In Re: Consolidated</u>

<u>Bank Shares</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 49 BR 467 and the case of In the Matter of goes back to the First Colonial case, but I'm going to what I consider minor items as opposed to the four major items first and go down those.

The first item I want to speak on is the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved. I really saw nothing particularly novel or unusually complex about the services rendered on behalf of the bank. They are complex in the sense that bankruptcy itself is complex, and if you don't have a knowledge of a lawyer knowing what they are doing, they can get in trouble quick, but this wasn't any new issue on the breaking edge of new developments in bankruptcy law. It was important. It was money involved, but it was basically a meat and potatoes type issue.

The skill to perform the legal services properly, as I stated, it did require a good level of skill to represent the bank in this, not that it was a novel issue, but the problem was that they had the cows there, and they had a good first lien on it, but it seemed like everybody wanted to keep getting their hands on that cattle, and they had to be vigilant about that on cash collateral issues, on the second lien behind them, on the landlord claiming some lands and things like that, so they did need experienced legal counsel, and I think that Mr. Sulser was that.

Next item, the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case. Obviously you can't work on two things at once, but this was not a mega type case where Mr. Sulser had to drop all other cases and devote his time solely to this and run the risk of losing new, incoming business, so I didn't think that was of any significance.

Next item, whether the fee is fixed or contingent. Obviously it was not a contingent matter. Mr. Sulser was going to get paid on a straight hourly basis by the bank.

Time limitations imposed by the client

of the circumstances. There was -- and the testimony was, and the docket sheets and files reflected, there was some time limitations imposed in the summer after this -- in June, July, and August when this case was first filed. There were numerous hearings down here that Mr. Sulser did have to attend and be here on behalf of his client on those.

The next item, the undesirability of the case, I saw nothing undesirable about representing the bank in this case, and I would think it would be desirable type business that any firm would be pleased to have.

The next item, the nature and length of the professional relationship with this client, I gave this no particular great weight, because they were in it a long time in that they started back in '85. I don't remember any testimony about any prior relationship with the bank. Maybe they had represented them for a while, but I saw that had no great significance in setting any fees in this case.

Awards in similar cases is that we had two lawyers testify that the hourly rates charged were \$100 an hour, were customary in this area for

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I will then go back to the other items that we had talked about, which are the special heed factors, you might say. The time and labor required. In going over the time sheets in here, I did not -- I feel that the time sheets that were submitted and the time that is requested was in keeping with what might be expected under normal circumstances. Usually what you look for on that is, to use phrases used in here, sometimes you hear of padding the bill, fat in there, double billing, this, that, and the other, but I didn't see any abuse in those statements. I did not see, like I see firms do sometimes, on what I -- normal matter they'll send two or three lawyers down There was one that came. I did not see here.

like I've seen before where you hire a lawyer to represent you, the next thing you see is two or three having a conference about what we're going to do now. I didn't see that in there. I didn't see any excessive use of paralegals, supposedly to save money, but looks like to me running up bills. I didn't see that in there, and I will touch on that again in a minute in an overall review of the case.

The experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney. Mr. Sulser testified, and it was stipulated, but he has experience in the field of bankruptcy and has practiced a good bit in this and other courts, and I believe that he is an experienced attorney and has a good reputation.

The customary fee we have touched on before and will touch on again, but the \$100 an hour is within the range of the customary fees that are charged for this type work, and it's supported by the testimony.

The amounts involved and the results obtained, as far as the results goes, it appears to me that Mr. Sulser protected the interest of his client and got a good result in that sense, which is what they hired him to do.

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becomes due.

the arguments or reservations that were expressed by Mr. and Mrs. Sullivan and by their attorney in opening arguments and during testimony, you know, under the American rule, you just have a lawsuit of negligence or suing on open account when there's no statutory provision for it. Each side has to bear their own attorney fees regardless of who wins and loses, but that can be varied by contract, and that is what was done in this particular case and which is normal that you see when you borrow from any lending institution and they get you to sign a promissory note and security agreement, they customarily provide for the payment of collection fees, including attorney fees, if they don't get the money as and when it

Getting back to the document itself and

And I believe that this guage is controlled by the original note dated May 22nd, 1985 in the original principle amount of -- original amount of \$159,900, and it says that, "Attorney Fees and Costs, I agree to pay the costs you incur to collect this note in the event of my default including your reasonable attorney fees," and then it goes down into telling what default

is, and it's a list there of several items, failure to make payments on time and other things, and I'm not going down the whole list now, but it mentions bankruptcy being a default.

Well, those type provisions where a note can be accelerated or you are default simply by filing bankruptcy was not -- they are invalid under the bankruptcy law so that they couldn't accelerate them because they filed bankruptcy, but I believe that when they don't get paid on time and a bankruptcy is filed and they've got to protect their interest, then certainly they're entitled to attorney fees under that note, and that's not -- that is a matter of contracts under 506 that they're entitled to.

Now, going to the fees that have been requested, the court is of the opinion that the fees that were requested for, I would say, through May of 1990, I'm of the opinion that those fees should not be allowed. For instance, in May of 1985 there are fees in there for I believe \$330.22, somewhere in that neighborhood. Now, the next ones I see are in the fall of '89 and early part of 1990 which, as I understood the testimony and looking at the statements in there, really had

to do with renewing some notes and filing new UCC filings through the secretary of state and making sure that their property was -- the priorities were properly noticed, the third parties and stuff like that, but I don't really consider those type legal fees covered under the terms of this note, under the circumstances of the note.

Now, I don't doubt and I think the proof shows that the note was in default frequently in the sense that when a payment was due on a certain day, it wasn't -- technically it was in default, but basically those are handled by the bank in-house by working with the debtor, getting the payment, renewing the note and stuff like that, and I don't really consider the legal representation of getting the note renewed and new UCC filings and stuff like that being attorney fees.

Now, I realize that those were attorney fees connected with this loan, but if those fees are to be covered, such as filing fees or if you want them to pay you to have the title checked and things like that, that could be part of the loan agreement and might be part of the loan agreement, but I don't have that here. I simply have the

1 note, and that's what I'm look at, and I don't see 2 anything in there to cover normal type commercial fees for simply you getting your property protected, so I'm not allowing any of those 4 through May, but I am going to allow all of the statements that were filed here beginning with the one dated June 30, 1990 which had the first time

on it dated June 4, 1990.

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So the amount that I calculated on the excluded statements was \$1,735.02, so this is the way I'm calculating what I am going to allow: \$16,885.90 less \$1,735.02, which gives you a subtotal of \$15,150.88 plus I am allowing \$1200 for the time today, which is \$16,350.88, less any charges for fax machine except \$1 per page outgoing, and I did not calculate that. Y'all can calculate it.

In my own opinion, for whatever that is, and this is not legal opinion, but this is a case that should never have come here except the fact that you've got a right to bring it here. But when a person is a debtor on a written agreement where he is obligated to pay attorney fees involved with the collection of that note, unless the fees are extremely high, you find

yourself digging your hole deeper quickly because you're having to pay your own attorney, plus you wind up playing the attorney on the other side, and if a person feels strongly about it, of course that's their right to feel that way, but the money is a lot different. But it reminds me of when I was practicing law and I'd have people that were in a divorce and unhappy with each other, and they'd get hung up over furniture in the house and want both lawyers to argue about the price of the furniture, and they'd wind up paying more in attorney fees than all the furniture was worth.

We had a matter here that the attorney fees were in dispute in the earlier part of the year, and we wound up burning up a lot more attorney fees arguing about attorney fees, but under the law I believe that what I have decided is in keeping with the law, so if y'all will calculate those final facts and submit a proposed judgment to me, I will appreciate it.

(Court concluded at 7:15 p.m.)

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## CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I, Susan M. Yeager, Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for the County of Madison, State of Mississippi, hereby certify that the foregoing pages, and including this page, contain a true and correct transcript of the testimony of the witness, as taken by me at the time and place heretofore stated, and later reduced to typewritten form by computer-aided transcription under my supervision to the best of my skill and ability.

I further certify that the witnesses were placed under oath to truthfully answer all questions in this matter.

I further certify that I am not in the employ of, or related to, any counsel or party in this matter, and have no interest, monetary or otherwise, in the final outcome of the proceedings.

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SUSAN M. YEAGER

Certified Shorthand Reporter

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My Commission Expires January 6, 1992